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5
Metacognition and
Computer-Based Testing
Gregory Schraw
Steven L. Wise
Linda L. Roos
The University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Metacognition refers to thinking about thinking, or more generally, to using higher-level knowledge and strategies to regulate lowerlevel performance. Previous research suggests that metacognition is
an important part of learning among adults (Baker, 1989; Garner &
Alexander, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990) and children (Alexander,
Carr, & Schwanenflugel, 1995; Borkowski & Muthukrishna, 1992).
Metacognition contributes to learning in several ways, but especially
by helping learners to use their attentional resources more efficiently,
to process information at a deeper level, and to monitor their performance more accurately.
Notwithstanding its importance, there is considerable debate
regarding how to measure meta cognition. At the heart of the problem
is the elusive nature of metacognitive knowledge itself. Most theorists assume meta cognitive knowledge is highly abstract and cuts
across domain-specific boundaries (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1987; Paris
& Byrnes, 1989; Schraw, Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995; Schraw &
Moshman,1995). In contrast, most declarative and procedural knowledge in memory is welded to a specific domain, and can be stated as
a declarative fact or demonstrated through a procedure. As a result,
declarative and procedural knowledge are much easier to identify,
manipulate, and measure than metacognitive knowledge. Added to
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this is the fact that metacognitive knowledge is acquired gradually
over long periods of time, emerges relatively late in development, and
often is difficult to explicate even when an individual demonstrates a
high degree of metacognitive competence (Brown, 1987; Garner, 1994;
Weinert & Kluwe, 1987).
Another problem is that metacognitive processes such as planning and evaluation are difficult to measure directly.
For this reason, researchers have relied on a variety of indirect
measures such as verbal reports, think-alouds, self-report inventories,
and subjective measures of performance accuracy. One consequence
of the unobservable nature of metacognitive knowledge and regulation is that researchers have focused their attention on several specific
aspects of metacognition that are easier to measure than others,
especially various forms of monitoring. Most studies have focused on
memory monitoring (Cavanaugh & Perlmutter, 1982; Johnson,
Hastroudi, & Lindsay, 1994; Lovelace, 1984; Koriat, 1993; Schneider &
Pressley, 1989), comprehension monitoring (Glenberg & Epstein, 1985;
Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Weaver, 1990), or performance monitoring
(Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990).
This chapter addresses problems related to the measurement of
metacognition in greater detail. We believe that some of the more
imposing obstacles can be addressed successfully via computer-based
testing procedures, but especially those pertaining to the assessment
of metacognitive control processes. We will argue that computerbased testing provides opportunities for researchers to measure control processes with much greater precision than with noncomputerized
methodologies. Computer-based testing enables us to do so in an
unobtrusive, reliable manner that is less apt to be confounded by
pre experimental knowledge and ability.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into six sections. The
first of these provides a brief overview of previous research and
presents a multilevel model of metacognition that distinguishes between two major components, including knowledge about and regulation of cognitive processes and knowledge. We further distinguish
between two subcomponents of meta cognitive regulation, including
meta cognitive control and monitoring. Control processes are used to
select performance goals and guide ongoing cognitive activities.
Monitoring processes are used to evaluate the present success of one's
performance and the degree to which one has met one's long-term
performance goals. We assume that control and monitoring are
reciprocally linked in a manner that facilitates self-regulation during
performance.

5. METACOGNITION AND COMPUTER-BASED TESTING

225

The overview is followed by a section that outlines some of the
methodological shortcomings of previous research. These include
issues pertaining to the reliability and construct validity of dependent
variables used in these studies. Of greater importance, this section
considers how dependence on a limited repertoire of methodological
strategies has precluded inquiry along two important lines. The first
concerns the investigation of metacognitive control. We believe that
few studies have investigated control processes at all, and that none
have done so directly. The second line of inquiry concerns the
relationship between control and monitoring processes. Current
conceptualizations of metacognition make a number of assumptions
about this relationship that have not been tested empirically.
The next section provides a review of recent developments in
computer-based testing that offer great promise for the measurement
of metacognition. These include the contribution of item-response
theory to the rapidly growing field of computerized adaptive testing
(i.e., tests in which a computer-controlled algorithm selects test items
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool) and self-adapted testing (i.e.,
tests in which examinees select item of a designated difficulty level
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool).
We consider ways that self-adapted testing (SAT) can be applied
to the measurement of metacognition in the next section. This
includes some of the psychometric advantages of SAT as well as a
description of on-line measures of cognitive and metacognitive behavior that can be used to test the model of metacognition proposed
later in this chapter. Specifically, we address how SAT can be used to
assess metacognitive control in a variety of ways, including a measure
of how accurately individuals select test items, as well as selection
times, item response times, and across-test item selection strategies.
The final section outlines an agenda for future research using
SAT. One important goal of this research is to link the kinds of data
collected in previous studies with the kind of on-line measures
available in SAT. Among other things, this would enable researchers
to compare the reliability of subjective paper-and-pencil judgments
made before, during, or after testing to objective measures collected
during SAT. Ideally, one would hope for a strong correspondence
between the two; however, one possibility is that pre- and post-test
subjective judgments do not correspond closely to actual on-line item
selection strategies. Another goal is that researchers investigate in
detail the relationship between control and monitoring. One would
expect these processes to be linked reciprocally, even though there is
no direct empirical evidence to support this assumption. Establishing
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such a relationship would suggest that control and monitoring processes are part of a larger regulatory system. In contrast, finding that
the two processes are not related strongly would suggest that each is
governed by a separate reservoir of knowledge.
The final section of the paper summarizes our main points and
offers some general conclusions. Chief among these is the claim that
researchers may benefit by incorporating recent innovations from the
computer-based testing community, and by using SAT to bridge the
gap between existing metacognitive theory and empirical studies that
do not adequately address questions raised by this theory.
COG NITIVE AN D METACOG NITIVE PROCESSES

Individuals rely on both cognitive and metacognitive skills when
learning (Garner & Alexander, 1989; Pressley, Borkowski, & Schneider,
1987). Cognitive skills are those that help a person perform a task;
metacognitive skills are those that help a person regulate and monitor
task performance (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; Schraw, 1994; Slife
& Weaver, 1992). Metacognition is thought to include two main
components (Baker & Brown, 1984; Brown, 1987; Jacobs & Paris,
1987). The first, knowledge of cognition, refers to what individuals
know about their own cognition or about cognition in general. It
usually includes three different kinds of metacognitive awareness:
declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge (Brown, 1987;
Jacobs & Paris, 1987; Schraw & Moshman, 1995). Declarative knowledge refers to knowing "about" things. Procedural knowledge refers
to knowing "how" to do things. Conditional knowledge refers to
knowing the "why" and "when" aspects of cognition. The second,
regulation of cognition, refers to metacognitive activities that help
control and monitor one's learning. Although a number of regulatory
skills have been described in the literature (Jacobs & Paris, 1987;
Kluwe, 1987), two that appear to be essential are control and monitoring processes.
A growing number of studies have been conducted over the past
decade investigating these components. Those focusing on the knowledge of cognition component typically employed either think-aloud
(Swanson, 1990) or self-report measures (Dixon, Hultsch, & Hertzog,
1988; Schraw & Delmison, 1994). Those focusing on the regulation of
cognition componen t, but especially the monitoring subcomponent,
typically employed some form of priming task, or asked individuals
to make subjec tive judgments of coniidence, ease of comprehension,
or overall learning prior to or subsequent to completing a test
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(Glenberg, Sanocki, Epstein, & Morris, 1987; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990;
Weaver, 1990).
Unfortunately, because many of these studies used widely
different materials, data collection procedures, and criterion measures, results are mixed and often difficult to compare. In lieu of
a comprehensive review of these diverse findings, we turn briefly
to a summary of recent research investigating the control and
monitoring subcomponents. We do so for two reasons. One is to
provide a more detailed definition of each construct. A second is
to delineate the strengths and weaknesses of recent empirical
research.
Research on Control

Metacognitive control refers to regulatory processes that occur
prior to or during a learning activity tha t direct the course of cognitive
activities. These processes include but are not restricted to planning,
allocating resources, selecting strategies, and setting specific performance goals. Control processes typically are assumed to guide
cognitive activities in a top-down manner (Nelson & Narens, 1990,
1994). Most theorists also assume that control processes are intentional, nonautomated, and partially statable (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger,
1990; Pressley, Harris, & Marks, 1992).
Many studies have investigated the effect of strategy instruction
on meta cognitive control (see Garner, 1987; Pressley et al., 1987;
Pressley, 1995, for reviews). These studies invariably indicate that
strategy instruction increases metacognitive control in two ways:
through better use of limited cognitive resources and more elaborative processing (Willoughby, Wood, & Khan, 1994; Wood, Pressley, &
Winne, 1990). However, few of these studies have shown attempts to
assess the accuracy of enhanced control processes, the degree to
which learners have metacognitive awareness about enhanced control, and the extent to which enhanced control is related to monitoring
accuracy.
Several studies have investigated the relationship between
control and monitoring more directly. Pressley and colleagues
(see Pressley & Ghatala, 1990, for a review) found that experimental manipulations that improved performance (presumably by
enhancing meta cognitive control) did not lead to more accurate
monitoring among college students . In contrast, Maki and colleagues (Maki & Serra, 1992; Maki, Foley, Kajer, Thompson, &
Willert, 1990) found that experimental manipulations that neces-
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sitated deeper information processing (e.g., asking readers to generate missing text information) led to more accurate monitoring.
Other studies have used estimates of future performance on a
specific task as a measure of metacognitive control. Schraw (1994)
asked college students to estimate their ability to monitor accurately
their reading comprehension. Control predictions were correlated
positively (i.e., p < .01) with test performance and post-test estimates
of monitoring accuracy. Levels of self-assessed monitoring ability
also were related to item-by-item and end-of-test monitoring accuracy. Those who rated themselves as normatively accurate monitors
tended to be more accurate and to improve more than poor monitors
as a function of self-generated feedback. These findings suggested
that older learners possess knowledge about metacognitive processes
and use this knowledge strategically to control their performance and
monitoring.
A follow-up study by Schraw (1995) examined performance control judgments (i.e., pretest estimates of one's ability to perform well
in a specific domain) across a variety of content domains and test
formats. Results indicated that control judgments were correlated
positively among domains even when test performance was controlled statistically. This suggested that metacognitive control may
be a domain-general rather than domain-specific phenomenon. However, control judgments across different types of tests (i.e., recognition of facts versus recall of inferential relationships) were unrelated.
This suggested that control judgments may be dependent on the
specific cognitive processes required of a particular test format (see
Pressley & Ghatala, 1990, and Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1994, for a
further discussion).
Research on Monitoring

Metacognitive monitoring refers to processes that occur during or
after a learning activity that provide information about the effectiveness of those activities. These processes are used to evaluate the
present success of one's performance and the degree to which one has
met one's long-term performance goals. Monitoring is important
because it provides self-generated feedback to the control system.
Without accurate monitoring, efficient control of one's performance
may be impossible. Most theorists assume that monitoring is a datadriven process; that is, monitoring accuracy may be a function of
domain familiarity, automaticity, and task difficulty (Koriat, 1993;
Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994).
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Monitoring studies typically require individuals to make subjective judgments of learning or test performance during or after an
initial study phase. Judgments are made for each test item using a 5or 7-point Likert scale, although some researchers have used other
techniques such as a continuous, bipolar scale adapted from the
multidimensional literature (see Schraw, Potenza, & Nebelsick-Gullet, 1993, for a further description) . The main purpose of these studies
is to determine the degree to which individuals accurately assess their
learning and performance.
Four types of judgments have been used in the adult monitoring
literature, including ease of learning (i.e., judgments of encoding difficulty), judgments of learning (i.e., the degree to which information was
learned during the study phase), feeling of knowing (i.e., the degree to
which one has access to previously learned information in memory),
and pelformance judgments (i.e., assessments of performance accuracy).
These four types of judgments have been used by researchers to
operationalize metacognitive processes involved in the acquisition,
retention, and retrieval of information (Nelson & Narens, 1994).
Monitoring studies differ widely with respect to the type of
criterion measure used to assess monitoring ability. Many studies use
some form of correlation, although a number of studies report other
measures such as bias (Schraw & Roedel, 1994), accuracy (Tobias,
1996), discrimination (Lundeberg, Fox, & Puncochar, 1994), or a
multicomponent measure based on bias, correlation, and discrimination (Yates, 1990). Currently, there is widespread disagreement about
the relative effectiveness of these measures (Keren, 1991; Liberman &
Tversky, 1993; Nelson, 1984; Schraw, 1995). One point of agreement
is that different criterion measures affect both observed results and
how researchers interpret these results.
These studies generally suggest that adults monitor their learning
and performance with a moderate degree of success, although results
vary from study to study. Surprisingly, monitoring proficiency does
not appear to be related strongly to relevant domain knowledge
(Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Morris, 1990; Schraw et al., 1995) or
academic achievement (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988, 1990). These conclusions have been supported in the children's monitoring literature
as well, although there is considerable debate regarding whether
children monitor as accurately as adults (Alexander, Carr, &
Schwanenflugel, 1995; Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988).
Situational constraints also affect estimates of monitoring proficiency. One constraint is the point in the learning-test sequence in
which monitoring judgments are made. A number of studies indicate
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that calibration of comprehension (i.e., the correlation between pretest
judgments and actual test performance) is often quite poor, with most
studies reporting correlations in the .00 to .25 range (Glenberg et al.,
1987; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). In contrast, calibration of performance (i.e., the correlation between posttestjudgments and actual test
performance) appears to be much better in both children and adults,
often ranging from .30 to .50 (Glenberg et al., 1987; Maki & Serra, 1992;
Maki et al., 1990; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990).
A second constraint is that specific testing conditions affect monitoring proficiency. For example, calibration of comprehension can be
improved under the following circumstances: (a) when adjunct questions similar to post-test questions are provided during study (Pressley,
Snyder, Levin, Murray, & Ghatala, 1987), (b) when periodic feedback
is provided to test takers (Ghatala, Levin, Foorman, & Pressley, 1989),
(c) when expert knowledge about the to-be-Iearned material is minimized (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987), and (d) when test takers generated
missing text information (Maki et al., 1990). Surprisingly, calibration
of comprehension does not appear to improve when learners were
specifically requested to monitor their comprehension or when they
are given the opportunity to re-study the to-be-Iearned materials
(Ghatala et al., 1989), or when they were given practice questions
prior to study (Maki & Serra, 1992).
Like calibration of comprehension, calibration of performance
improved under a number of testing conditions, especially when
adjunct questions were provided during the study phase (Pressley et
al., 1988), when test takers received external incentives to improve
monitoring accuracy (Schraw et al., 1994), and when test takers
received recall rather than recognition tests (Pressley, Ghatala,
Woloshyn, & Pirie, 1990). Calibration of performance also was related
to level of test performance (Schraw & Roedel, 1994). Individuals
monitored with less bias when judging their performance on easy
rather than more difficult items.
A third general constraint is that monitoring proficiency improves with feedback, incentives, practice, and training. Stock,
Kulhavy, Pridemore, and Krug (1992) found that experimenter-provided feedback increased the accuracy of confidence judgments.
Schraw (1994) reported that pre-experimental estimates of monitoring
proficiency were related to both local (i.e., the accuracy of itemspecific performance judgments made during testing) and global (i.e.,
judgments of overall performance made after testing) monitoring
accuracy. The accuracy of local monitoring was correlated positively
to the accuracy of global monitoring. In addition, the change in
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monitoring accuracy between local and global monitoring improved
significantly among good monitors, but did not improve among poor
monitors.
Monitoring proficiency also improves when individuals are given
incentives to monitor their performance more accurately. Schrawet
al. (1993) found that additional course credit for normatively high
monitoring accuracy led to more accurate monitoring, whereas additional credit for normatively high test performance had no effect on
monitoring accuracy. In addition, incentives to monitor more accurately improved test performance even though incentives to perform
better did not.
Monitoring training also improves performance. Delclos and
Harrington (1991) examined fifth and sixth grader's ability to solve
computer problems after assignment to one of three conditions. The
first group received specific problem-solving training, the second
received problem-solving plus self-monitoring training and practice,
and the third received no training. The monitored problem-solving
group solved more of the difficult problems than either of the remaining groups and took less time to do so. The group receiving problemsolving and monitoring training also solved complex problems faster
than the control group.
Summary

The control and monitoring research summarized above leads to
a number of conclusions. Regarding control, most adults achieve
some degree of metacognitive control by using helpful learning
strategies. Second, many adults possess some explicit metacognitive
knowledge about their ability to control performance. Third,
metacognitive control in one domain tends to be related to control in
another domain, even when performance is taken into consideration.
Fourth, metacognitive control appears to be superior in adults
(Alexander et al., 1995).
Regarding monitoring, adults monitor their performance with a
moderate degree of accuracy. Monitoring improves as tests become
easier and more factual. Second, monitoring proficiency appears to
be independent of intellectual ability (Alexander et al., 1995; Swanson,
1990) and academic achievement (Pressley & Ghatala, 1988). Third,
monitoring proficiency may be independent or even negatively related to domain knowledge (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987), independent
of ease of comprehension judgments (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990), but
correlated with other types of metacognitive knowledge (Schraw,
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1994; Schraw & Dennison, 1994). Fourth, one's ability to monitor one's
performance may improve with practice (Delclos & Harrington, 1991).
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT MEASUREMENT APPROACHES
It could be argued that the gap between metacognitive theory and
empirical research is as great as any other area of psychological
inquiry. These are several specific reasons for this state of affairs,
many of them being methodological in nature (Kruglanski, 1989).
This section divides these problems into three interrelated categories
that are ranked ordered from our vantage point in order of importance. The three categories include task, test, and person constraints on
the measurement of control and monitoring.
Task Constraints

Task constraints refer to characteristics of the experimental task
that impede measurement of either control or monitoring processes.
The most serious obstacle is that researchers cannot manipulate either
control or monitoring processes directly, but must be content to
manipulate the task environment in which control and monitoring are
performed. This means that researchers must make inferences about
complex metacognitive processes on the basis of indirect measures.
Although this is certainly not a new problem to psychologists, it is a
serious one.
Operationalizing metacognitive control has been an especially
virulent problem. Presumably, the best way to study control processes would be to allow the examinee to exercise a great deal of
strategic control over his or her performance. Previous studies have
attempted to do so by providing specific task information, learning
goals, opportunity to study, strategies for learning, or conditions
under which learning is facilitated. In essence, these studies examined whether a variety of experimental factors affected metacognitive
control. However, none of these studies allowed examinees to demonstrate overtly in a directly observable manner how they attempted
to control their test-taking behavior. One way to do so would be
through the use of on-line verbal protocols in which individuals
describe their cognitive processes (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Pressley &
Afflerbach, 1995). However, although an important research tool,
verbal reports are intrusive, resource consuming, and assume that
individuals have explicit access to metacognitive processes.
An alternative would be to study the way examinees make
strategic choices throughout a test. In self-adapted testing, for ex-
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ample, individuals choose test items of a designated difficulty level
from a multilevel, calibrated item pool. This may enable researchers
to examine several aspects of metacognitive control in an explicit, yet
unobtrusive manner. One aspect is the goodness of fit (i.e., calibration
accuracy) between self-selected items and observed performance.
Another aspect is whether examinees show evidence of improved
accuracy over the course of the entire test.
A somewhat different task constraint is introduced when researchers ask examinees to make subjective judgments of learning
and performance while simultaneously performing complex tasks.
Researchers invariably assume that such ratings have little effect on
performance, although oddly, there are no empirical studies we know
of that have investigated this assumption. Of greater importance,
researchers also assume that the demands of taking a test have little
impact on the accuracy of subjective ratings. This assumption clearly
is untenable in that confidence judgments become increasingly more
biased as a function of test difficulty (Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schwartz
& Metcalfe, 1994). Although researchers have attempted to compensate for such problems via the judicious use of statistical analyses (cf.
Nelson, 1984), no amount of statistical tinkering can eliminate these
problems entirely (cf. Funder, 1987; Keren, 1991; Liberman & Tversky,
1993; Schraw, 1995).
Test Constraints

Test constraints refer to characteristics of the test itself, rather than
the test environment, that impede measurement of either control or
monitoring processes. A recent review by Schwartz and Metcalfe
(1994) addressed four test-related problems that we summarize here.
One source of variation among examinees, and presumably an important source of measurement error, pertains to the type of test being
given. Recall tests often are assumed to be more cognitively demanding than recognition tests. Most empirical studies echo this difference
by revealing higher correlations between performance and confidence (or accuracy) judgments on recall tests. One reason for higher
correlations is less restriction of the range of scores on recall tests
when compared to recognition tests. Because recall tests are more
difficult, their scores will vary across a wider range of possible values.
In contrast, easier recognition tests restrict the observed range of a
correlation due to homogeneous performance or ceiling effects.
Another inadvertent problem of recognition tests is that examinees are influenced by the availability of information included in the
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test item. Because test answers are provided explicitly in a recognition test, but must be generated in a recall test, examinees are
significantly more confident when monitoring recognition tests, but
more accurate when monitoring recall tests (Ghatala, Levin, Foorman,
& Pressley, 1989).
A second major source of measurement error is the length of a
test, or if it is a recognition test, the number of alternatives from which
one may choose for each item. It is well established that a test's
reliability is directly related to its length, with longer tests, and
recognition tests with more alternatives, being more reliable (Crocker
& Algina, 1986). Unfortunately, many early studies of monitoring
used multiple tests with one or two items per test, rather than the
preferable one test with a large number of items. To illustrate,
Glenberg et al. (1987) reported no statistically significant relationship
between pretest judgments of learning and subsequent performance.
This group of experiments required individuals to answer one main
idea question per test for a large number of tests. Replicating this study,
having first increased the length of each test, Weaver (1990) fOlmd that
the observed value of r increased monotonically as a function of test
length, until it reached an asymptotic value of r = .60. Thus, Glenberg
et al. (1987) failed to identify a significant relationship between judgments of learrung and test performance due to unreliable test scores.
A third source of error is test difficulty. Monitoring accuracy
declines as a test becomes more difficult, even when test performance
is controlled statistically (Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schraw, Dunkle,
Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). In addition, overconfidence is more
common than underconfidence and more likely to occur when a test
is difficult (Cutler & Wolfe, 1989; Newman, 1984). These patterns
have been observed on a variety of tasks including probability judgments (Fischhoff, 1988), reading comprehension (Glenberg et al.,
1987), recalling emotions (Thomas & Diener, 1990), and social judgments (Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990).
There are at least two reasons a difficult test may interfere with
control and monitoring processes. One is that individuals lack
sufficient background knowledge to answer the test question. It is
well known that individuals resort to a number of helpful, but fallible,
heuristics under these circumstances that bias their judgments
(Fischhoff, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). A second reason is that
information in memory is inaccessible during testing (i.e., available in
memory, but presently unretrievable). Partial or total inaccessibility
may lead to severe judgment bias due not only to poor monitoring,
but fallible retrieval processes as well (Koriat, 1993, 1994).
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A fourth source of error is knowledge about the test. Testrelevant knowledge may affect control and monitoring in several
ways-namely, by enabling examinees to identify test-relevant information more efficiently, process information at a test-appropriate
level (McDaniel & Einstein, 1989), and utilize self-generated feedback
(Glenberg et al., 1987). In general, as knowledge of the test increases,
performance and the reliability of tests improve as well (Schwartz &
Metcalfe, 1994). Research by Metcalfe (1993) also found that administering a test that was not expected reduced the correlation between
performance judgments and actual performance dramatically.
Person Constraints

There are a number of ways that prior knowledge might affect
control and monitoring processes negatively, and thereby reduce the
reliability of measurements (Baker, 1989; Garner & Alexander, 1989).
Insufficient knowledge may preclude the use of helpful learning and
test strategies and lead to lower performance. Lower performance
may, in turn, lead to a resh·iction in the range of observed test scores.
Low domain knowledge also makes a test more difficult, which has
several deleterious effects on monitoring already described above.
It is possible that prior knowledge interacts with many of the
constraints described above in complex ways. For example, low prior
knowledge presumably affects the degree to which individuals learn
information during a pretest study session. Poorer learning leads to
a greater amount of inaccessible information and a more difficult test.
Low prior knowledge in a domain also may restrict deeper information processing that could affect performance on some test questions,
but not others.
It is important to note, however, that increasing prior knowledge
per se does not seem to improve monitoring (Nelson & Narens, 1990;
Pressley et al., 1990), unless the inclusion of prior knowledge provides
an opportunity for self-generated feedback or additional knowledge
about the test itself (Glenberg et al., 1987). For example, research by
Morris (1990) found that although knowledge was related positively
to performance, it was not related to monitoring accuracy. Schraw
(Schraw & Roedel, 1994; Schraw et al., 1995) extended these findings
across multiple domains, arguing that individuals possess a domaingeneral (i.e., knowledge-independent) monitoring skill that is independent of domain knowledge. Glenberg and Epstein (1987) also
reported that higher levels of expert knowledge actually interfered
with accurate monitoring.
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Summary

Empirical studies of control and monitoring lag behind
metacognitive theory. One important reason is that each of these
processes is difficult to operationalize experimentally and to manipulate directly. Researchers have relied on several limited measurement
paradigms, including error detection (see Baker & Cerro, this volume)
and subjective calibration judgments. Both of these methodologies
are fraught with measurement problems related to the nature of the
task itself, to factors including the type and difficulty of the test, and
to characteristics of the examinee.
In subsequent sections of this chapter we argue that self-adapted
testing allows researchers to eliminate many of these problems, and
thereby increase the construct validity of tests (Rocklin, O'Donnell, &
Holst, 1995), by (a) controlling for test and item difficulty using a
calibrated pool of independent test items, (b) reducing measurement
error attributable to characteristics of the examinees such as ability
and prior knowledge, (c) utilizing unobtrusive measures that do not
compete for the examinees' limited resources, and most importantly,
(d) allowing the test taker to exercise a much greater degree of control
during the testing process. We turn now to a brief overview of
computer-based testing and two recent developments: computerized
adaptive and self-adapted testing.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EDUCATIONAL AND
PSYCHOLOG ICAL MEASUREMENT
Item Response Theory

During the past few decades, Item Response Theory (IRT), has
emerged as the psychometric model used by an increasing number of
testing programs in education and psychology. For large-scale achievement and proficiency tests in particular, IRT has largely supplanted
classical test theory as the basis for test development, scoring, and
equating. The central concept of IRT is the item characteristic curve
(ICC), which specifies the relationship between the level of an
examinee's proficiency (i.e., estimated ability) and the probability that
he or she passes the item.
The most commonly used IRT models assume that there is a
monotonic relationship between examinee proficiency and the probability of passing an item. In addition, it is assumed that the set of test
items under consideration is unidimensional (i.e., measures a single,
unobservable construct). It has been typically found, however, that
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the IRT model will adequately fit the test data if there is one sufficiently dominant factor underlying the items. A detailed explanation
of IRT is beyond the scope of this chapter; the interested reader is
referred to Hambleton, Swaminathan, and Rogers (1991) for a good
overview of basic IRT concepts.
Two principles of IRT are particularly relevant to the present
discussion. The first is a key property of IRT, termed invariance,
which states that an examinee's proficiency is independent of the
characteristics of the items that are administered. Consider the case
in which there is an available pool of 400 test items, and that it is larger
than would be administered to a given examinee (e.g., 100 items)
during a testing session. Regardless of which 100 items were administered from the pool, the examinee's expected proficiency estimate
would be invariant. Invariance holds because IRT-based proficiency
estimates take into account both (a) characteristics (primarily difficulty) of the items that were administered and (b) the examinee's
performance on those items. An important implication of invariance
is that two examinees can receive completely different tests, drawn
from the same item pool, yet their proficiency estimates can be
compared. Any differences in difficulty of the two tests are taken into
account by the IRT estimation procedure.
It should be noted that invariance is not a feature of the classical
test theory measurement model, in which proficiency estimation is
based solely on test performance (i.e., number of items passed). If two
examinees take two tests that differ in difficulty, then the difference
between the examinees' proficiency levels is confounded with the
difference between the difficulty of the tests.
A second principle of IRT that is of particular relevance to the
study of examinee monitoring and control is that the difficulty parameters of the ICCs, which indicate the relative difficulties of the items,
are placed on the same scale as examinee proficiency. This joint
scaling is depicted in Figure 1, which indicates that Item 1 is the least
difficult item, followed by Item 2, and so on through Item 5. Moreover, examinee A is the least proficient of the three examinees, and
Examinee C the most proficient.
Measuring difficulty and proficiency on the same scale allows one
to assess the degree of match between the difficulty of an item and an
examinee's proficiency. Why is this joint scaling important? The
closer the match between an item's difficulty and an examinee's
proficiency, the more informative is the examinee's response to that
item in estimating his/her proficiency. Hence, more difficult items
are most informative for more proficient examinees, whereas less
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difficult items are most informative for less proficient examinees. In
Figure I, the most informative items for Examinees A, B, and Care
Items 2, 3, and 5, respectively.

Figure 1. The joint scaling of item difficulty and examinee proficiency in IRT.
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Computer-Based Testing

With the introduction and rapid proliferation of microcomputers
came an increased use of computers to administer tests. There are a
number of advantages realized with computer-based testing that may
make it attractive to examinees, including the capability for ondemand testing, as well as immediate test scoring and reporting of
results. From a researcher's standpoint, however, computer-based
testing provides two additional advantages. First, it allows a much
greater degree of control over the test administration. Such control
may include (a) the order in which items are considered and answered, (b) how long each item is presented, and (c) whether or not
examinees are allowed to review, and possibly change, their answers
to items. Second, it allows the researcher to unobtrusively collect a
great deal of information about the test session, such as how long an
examinee took to respond to each item or whether or not the examinee
changed his/her answers to any test items. Because of these advantages, a computer-based test provides a unique opportunity for re-
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searchers to study examinee test-takil1.g behavior. With paper-andpencil tests, such advantages are unavailable.
Computerized Adaptive Testing. Computerized adaptive testing
(CAT) combines the psychometric advantages of IRT with the computing power of current microcomputers. In a CAT, a computer
algorithm is used to match the difficulty of the items administered to
the estimated proficiency of each examinee. At each step in a CAT,
the next item to be administered is a function of the examinee's
responses to previously administered items. Using a CAT, examinee
ability is estimated more efficiently than with a conventional test
because typically fewer items are required to attain the same degree
of measurement precision. It has typically has been found that a CAT
requires about half as many items to estimate an examinee's proficiency with the same degree of precision as a paper-and-pencil test.
Note that both of the IRT principles discussed earlier are essential
to a CAT. Because item difficulty and examinee proficiency are on the
same scale, items having difficulties matching an examinee's current
proficiency estimate can readily be identified and administered. And,
because examinees receive unique tests, the invariance property allows their proficiency estimates to be compared.
Self-Adapted Testing. Although CAT is by far the most popular
application of IRT in computer-based testing, other applications have
been studied. One of these is self-adapted testing (Rocklin & O'Donnell,
1987). A SAT is similar to a CAT with one important exception. In
a self-adapted test, the examinee is allowed to choose the difficulty
level of each test item administered, whereas in a CAT a computer
algorithm chooses each item to be administered based on the
examinee's performance on items administered earlier in the testing
session.
In a SAT, an examinee chooses the difficulty level of each item
administered from an item pool has been divided into several (typically 5-8) ordered difficulty levels, or strata, based on the IRT difficulty parameters of the items. This relationship among difficulty
levels is illustrated in Figure 2. Testing begins with the examinee
choosing the difficulty level of the first item, at which point an item
from the chosen stratum is drawn (without replacement) in a random
fashion and administered. After this item is answered, the examinee
is then asked to choose the difficulty level of the next item. This
procedure continues until a predetermined number of items has been
administered or a desired precision of proficiency estimation has been
reached. After item administration is completed, the examinee's test
performance is calculated using an IRT-based proficiency estimation
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method. As with a CAT, because proficiency estimation is IRT based,
the invariance property insures that the test performances of different
examinees receiving a SAT can be directly compared even though
they may have chosen to be administered tests that varied substantially in difficulty. Successful implementation of a SAT is largely
dependent on the instructions presented at the beginning of the test.
It must be explained to examinees that their test performance will be
evaluated on the basis of the difficulty levels they choose as well as
the number of items that they pass. Because most examinees are used
to taking tests where performance is based solely on how many items
are passed, examinees taking a SAT may tend to choose low difficulty
levels unless adequate instructions are provided. Hence it is very
important to provide examinees with clear instructions when administering a SAT. An example of instructions used with a SAT are found
in Wise, Plake, Johnson, and Roos (1992) .
The research on SAT conducted thus far has focused on its effects
on test performance and its relationship to examinee affective variables. Several studies have compared SAT with CAT, finding that
examinees receiving a SAT obtained significantly higher mean proficiency estimates (Roos, Plake, & Wise, 1992; Wise et al., 1992; Vispoel
& Coffman, 1994). Moreover, the difference in mean estimated
proficiency between SAT and CAT has been found to interact with
other variables. Significant interactions have been found between test
type and examinee scores on the Test Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger,
1980), with the difference in mean estimated proficiency between SAT
and CAT increasing with examinee test anxiety (Rocklin & O'Donnell,
1991; Vispoel & Coffman, 1994; Vispoel, Rocklin, & Wang, 1994;
Vispoel, Wang, de la Torre, Bleiler, & Dings, 1992). In addition,
Figure 2. Item Difficulty level strata in self-adapted testing .
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Vispoel et al. (1994) found a significant interaction between examinee
verbal self-concept and test type, with the largest difference in mean
estimated proficiency between SAT and CAT being associated with
low examinee verbal self-concept.
There also is evidence that the use of a SAT moderates the
relationship between examinee anxiety and test performance. In two
studies comparing SAT and CAT it was found that examinees administered a SAT reported significantly lower post-test state anxiety than
examinees administered a CAT (Roos et al., 1992; Wise et al., 1992). It
has also been found that a SAT yields proficiency estimates that are
less related to test anxiety than those obtained when a CAT or a
conventional test is used (Rocklin & O'Donnell, 1991; Vispoel &
Coffman, 1994; Vispoel et al., 1994; Vispoel et al., 1992). The findings
from these studies suggest that use of a SAT reduces the influence of
anxiety on test performance.
CONTROL, MON ITORING, AND SELF-ADAPTED TESTI NG

Although previous research on SAT has focused on its effects on
anxiety and test performance, a SAT also affords an opportunity to
measure elements of metacognition. To tmderstand this, it is useful
to consider the activities of the examinee during his/her test. A
difficulty level is chosen by the examinee, an item is administered, the
examinee answers the item, and the examinee is provided a choice for
the difficulty level of the next item. This sequence is repeated wltil the
test is completed.
We have observed that most examinees vary their difficulty level
choices during the course of a SAT. Moreover, it has been found that
many examinees tend to adjust their difficulty level choices to receive
items that are well-matched to their proficiency levels (Wise et al.,
1992). That is, many examinees taking a SAT appear to be motivated
to attain the same difficulty-proficiency match that is explicitly sought
by the computer algorithm in a CAT.
What psychological processes might be involved in attaining this
match? We contend that two key processes are monitoring and
control. Monitoring is required to assess the difficulty of the previous
item, and to compare its difficulty to one's perceived proficiency.
Control is then required to make a strategic choice, regarding the next
item's difficulty, on the basis of the perceived degree of match
between item difficulty and proficiency. If the match is sufficiently
close, then the examinee will likely choose the same difficulty level as
the previous item. If the match is not judged to be close then the
examinee will change difficulty levels in order to attain a closer
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difficulty-proficiency match. For example, if the examinee's monitoring process yields a judgement that the previous item was too easy,
then the control process will choose a more difficult next item.
Thus, whereas most of the previous research on SAT has focused
on the outcomes of taking a SAT, there is important information to be
gained by studying the process of taking a SAT. Through an analysis
of the SAT experience, we see that, although both monitoring and
control playa major role in the examinee's strategic choices, the
observable examinee behavior (difficulty level choice) most directly
reflects the control process. Later in this chapter we outline several
ways of using the data from a SAT to construct measures of the
control process.
Some Methodological Advantages of SAT

Self-adapted testing provides a unique, unobtrusive method for
gathering information about metacognitive processes, and especially
of control. Indeed, examinees need not be given specific instructions
about control or monitoring, or even know that their test behaviors
provide relevant information about these processes. The fact that
control processes are studied unobtrusively has two important advantages. One is that examinees are able to focus all of their resources
on the test, rather than dividing their attention between performance
and control-assessment activities. A second advantage is that direct
measures of metacognitive control are available (i.e., item selection
time and accuracy), rather than an indirect, subjective assessment of
control (i.e., confidence or accuracy judgments).
SAT has a number of other advantages as well that pertain
specifically to the task, test, and person constraints described earlier
in this chapter. The most important of these is examinee control.
Whereas all previous studies have asked examinees to complete a test
designed by researchers, SAT enables an examinee to choose items that
he or she feels are best suited to his or her proficiency without compromising comparability among examinees. With respect to the study of
metacognition, individuals with a high degree of metacognitive control
should be able to select difficult, yet answerable items. Those with less
control may select test items that are less appropriate for them. Those
with poor control may regularly select items that are too easy or too
difficult. The self-controlled nature of SAT enables researchers to
study the relationship among selection time, accuracy, and overall
test proficiency, as well as a variety of self-report judgments made
prior to, during, or subsequent to the test. Experiments could be
expanded to examine motivational variables as well.
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SAT also may increase the construct validity of proficiency estimates, and presumably measures of metacognitive control, by reducing confounds due to anxiety (Rocklin et al., 1995; Wise, 1994) and test
difficulty. This helps to reduce or eliminate many of the test-based
constraints typical of previous studies. For example, given that
individuals select test items from a pool of calibrated items, the
difficulty of these items should have little effect on the accuracy of
metacognitive control. This is in stark contrast to traditional paperand-pencil tests in which examinees monitor their p erformance with
greater bias as test items increase in difficulty.
Another strength of SAT is the property of invariance, which
enables each examinee to select items that are optimally suited to his
or her proficiency. Differences in the absolute difficulty of items need
not compromise estimates of metacognitive control. This means that
measures of metacognitive control are comparable on the same scale
even though individuals may be administered different test items and
even though individuals differ with respect to underlying ability.
The fact that SAT yields comparable es timates of proficiency and
metacognitive control regardless of differences in ability eliminates a
crucial person constraint in the study of metacognitive processes. It
is likely that prior knowledge also has less impact on proficiency and
control estimates than it would using paper-and-pencil tests. Although
prior knowledge may greatly affect which items an examinee selects,
item selection in itself does not affect estimates of proficiency. On the
other hand, it is possible that individuals with no prior knowledge, or
a great deal of it, may be poorly suited to the test if tl1ere are an
insufficient munber of test items near theiJ: true proficiency level.
In summary, we believe tha t self-adapted tes ting provides a
unique opportunity to study on-line metacognitive control p rocesses
in an unobtrusive manner. The ability to do so permits researchers to
explore a number of theoretical relationships among control, monitoring, and other cognitive skills (e.g., working memory span) that
remain unanswered. We describe several intriguing questions in a
subsequent section on future research. First we describe two methodological constraints on the use of self-adapted testing, then we describe a number of direct or derived measures of metacognitive
control that are available from a typical SAT testing session.
Two Methodological Considerations

Two key issues must be addressed when using a SAT to measure
metacognitive control strategies. First, the distribution of the item
difficulties should span the range of the distribution of examinee
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proficiencies, with enough items throughout the range that an examinee could take an entire SAT consisting of items with the same
general level of difficulty. Having an item pool that is both "wide"
and "deep" prevents examinees from being administered items that
are not well matched to proficiency solely because well-matched
items are unavailable.
A second consideration concerns the instructions given to the
examinees. Without instructions for examinees to try to attain a close
difficulty-proficiency match, it is unclear whether examinees who did
not choose closely matched items did so because they were unable to
match well or because they chose their items to attain another goal
(e.g., reduction of test anxiety). Hence, examinees should be explicitly
told to try to attain a close match. This, however, raises a troublesome
new problem-how does one word such instructions such that examinees unequivocally understand their task?
The resources required to administer a SAT pose a third restriction on its use in metacognitive research. To administer a SAT, one
must have (a) an item pool that is of sufficient size and has a broad
range of item difficulty, (b) IRT parameter estimates for each item,
and (c) computer software for administering computer-based tests.
Regarding the item pool, it is important to have a distribution of item
difficulties that spans the range of examinee proficiencies, and is
"deep" enough that an examinee could choose a difficulty level that
reflects a close difficulty-proficiency match many times without exhausting the difficulty level and being forced to receive items that are
less well-matched. As an illustration, if a researcher plans to use eight
difficulty levels in administering a 20-item SAT, the item pool should
contain at least 160 items. Furthermore, IRT item parameter estimation requires a sizable calibration sample. Depending on the IRT
model used, the typical recommenda tions for minimum calibration
sample size range from 200 to over 1,000 examinees. Finally, special
microcomputer software is needed to administer the SAT, such as the
MicroCAT Testing System (Assessment Systems, 1994). Roos, Wise,
Yoes, and Rocklin (in press) describe the program code needed to
administer a SAT on the MicroCAT system.
QUANTIFYING METACOGNITIVE PROCESSES USING SELFADAPTED TESTING

Although both monitoring and control processes appear to be
at work in a self-adapted test, the control process is more easily
quantified using measures obtained during the testing process. A
self-adapted test that is administered using computer-based testing
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software such as MicroCAT (Assessment Systems, 1994) can provide
a variety of information that is relevant to the measurement of
metacognitive activities. When a MicroCAT test is administered, an
output file for each examinee is created containing a detailed record
of the examinee's testing session. The file can contain an item-by-item
record of the difficulty level chosen, whether the item was answered
correctly or incorrectly, the examinee's current proficiency estimate,
and its standard error, as well as the time taken both to choose the
item difficulty level and respond to the administered item. This
information is readily obtainable from the MicroCAT testing system
and does not require extensive programming skills on the part of the
researcher. A guide to developing self-adapted tests on MicroCAT is
provided by Roos, Wise, Yoes, and Rocklin (in press).
It is important to note that these measures are obtained in an
unobtrusive manner. This mode of data collection allows examinees
to focus their attention entirely on the test, alleviating concerns
regarding the effects on test performance of requesting examinees to
provide self-reports of metacognition.
There are several ways to quantify the relationship between the
metacognitive control process and test performance (i.e., proficiency).
To further illustrate these quantifications, we will refer to Tables 1 and
2. Table 1 is an example of a testing session for an examinee with a
good match between proficiency and item difficulty, whereas Table 2
provides an example of an examinee with a poor proficiency-item
difficulty match. Each examinee is administered 20 items from a pool
of calibrated items that are partitioned into six mutually exclusive
difficulty levels. For each item administered, the difficulty level
chosen is displayed in the second column where Levell contains the
easiest items and Level 6 contains the most difficult items. The
difficulty parameter of the administered item is displayed in the third
column. The difficulty parameters of the items are obtained using IRT
estimation methods; these parameter values are matched to the scale
of examinee proficiency, which typically has a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one. The higher the item difficulty parameter
value, the more difficult the item. The fourth column indicates the
difference between the examinee's proficiency and the difficulty of
the item. For example, the examinee in Table 1 had a final (i.e., endof-test) proficiency estimate of -1.31, which is relatively low. The first
item administered had a difficulty of -1.39, which indicates a close
proficiency-difficulty match (.08). The fifth column lists the absolute
value of the proficiency minus difficulty difference. The final column
indicates the correctness of the examinee's answer to the item.

Table 1. Testing Session for an Examinee With a Good Match Between Proficiency and Item Difficulty (Proficiency = - 1.31,
Standard Error = .319)

Item

Difficulty
Level Chosen

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3

Item Difficulty
Parameter
-1.39
- 1.13
- 1.73
- 1.42
- 1.28
- 1.30
- 1.32
-1.50
-1.25
- 1.39
- 1.77
- 1.67
- 1.30
-1.57
- 1.27
- 1.64
-0.73
- 1.24
- 1.12
- 1.14

Proficiency - Difficulty
Difference
0.08
-0.18
0.42
0.11
-0.03
-0.01
0.01
0.19
-0.06
0.08
0.46
0.36
-0.01
0.26
-0.04
0.33
-0.58
-0.07
-0.19
-0.17

Absolute
Difference

Item
Outcome

0.08
0.18
0.42
0.11
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.19
0.06
0.08
0.46
0.36
0.01
0.26
0.04
0.33
0.58
0.07
0.19
0.17
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Table 2. Testing Session for an Examinee With a Good Match Between Proficiencyand Item Difficulty (Proficiency = 0.32,
Standard Error = .620)
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The first measure of the relationship between metacognitive
control and test performance is provided by the proficiency-difficulty
differences. If instructed to attain a close proficiency-difficulty match,
examinees should proceed through the test, monitoring the difficulty
of the items administered and attempting to control subsequent
difficulty level choices to attain a close proficiency-difficulty match.
The degree to which an examinee is successful in controlling item
difficulty will be reflected by the magnitude of his/her proficiencydifficulty difference at the end of the test, with smaller differences
indicating greater control. Because the items are typically arranged
randomly within each difficulty level, perhaps a more reliable index
of the proficiency-difficulty match is provided by the average difference taken over the last five items. This is a measure of bias-the
degree to which an examinee tends to select items that are too easy or
too difficult. For example, the examinee in Table 1 showed a very
good proficiency-difficulty match (-.14), whereas the examinee in
Table 2 exhibited a poorer match (1.84) indicating a bias towards
choosing item difficulties that were too low.
Another measure of control is provided by the absolute value of
the proficiency-difficulty difference. This is an index of accuracy-the
degree to which selected item difficulties are matched to an examinee's
proficiency. This index is also quite different for the examinees in
Tables 1 and 2, with the examinee in Table 1 exhibiting a substantially
more accurate match.
The standard error of the final proficiency estimate provides an
alternative measure of accuracy. The more consistent the examinee is
in choosing items well-matched to his/her proficiency level, the
smaller the resultant standard error. Hence, the magnitude of the
standard error indicates the accuracy of the examinee choices. The
standard error for the examinee in Table 1 (.319) is substantially
smaller than that for the examinee in Table 2 (.620).
Additional information is available from the testing session that
may also prove useful in the study of control and (possibly) monitoring processes. One general type of information available is response
latency; that is, the amount of time examinees take to (a) choose item
difficulty levels and (b) answer items. Measures of this sort are very
difficult to obtain in a traditional paper-and-pencil test but are easily
and unobtrusively obtained when a test is administered via computer.
Researchers also may gain a better understanding of the control
process through an investigation of the strategies used by examinees
in selecting item difficulties. A computerized adaptive test provides
an efficient model of control because the item selection algorithm
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strives for a close proficiency-difficulty match. It would be particularly interesting, for example, to identify examinees who behave
nearly as efficiently (or perhaps even more efficiently) as the computerized adaptive algorithm.
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTUR

t RESEARCH

Self-adapted testing allo~s researchers to investigate at least six
questions pertaining to meta\~gnitive control, and the relationship
between control and monitoring, that have not been addressed adequately in previous research. We present these questions beginning
with the most obvious and specific ones, gradually moving toward
broader, more theoretical concerns.
Question one pertains to the relationship between metacognitive
control and test performance. Researchers often assume that more
accurate control leads to better test performance. SAT enables one to
test this relationship directly while eliminating confounds due to item
difficulty and presumed t.mderlying ability. Existing theory also
predicts a strong relationship between the accuracy of control judgments and performance (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Schraw, 1994).
Researchers could study the impact of practice, domain familiarity,
instructions, and other test-specific constraints via direct manipulation of these variables. Similarly, person-related variables such as
prior knowledge and working memory span could be examined via
blocking procedures, or treated as covariates.
Question two addresses the relationship between metacognitive
control and response latency variables, including item selection and
item response times. It is important to note that measures of response
latency do not provide pure measures of a single cognitive activity per
se. For example, item selection times, especially in the middle and
later parts of a test, reflect some mix of control, monitoring, and
performance processes. Nevertheless, SAT provides the best available methodology for assessing the relationship between control
accuracy and response time. There is little theoretical precedent thus
far regarding the relationship between control mechanisms and latencies. In general, response time and performance are related inversely,
although the magnitude of the relationship, as well as its direction,
depends on the type of variables being compared (Meyer, Irwin,
Osman & Kounios, 1988). We expect a similar relationship between
control accuracy and item response times. It is unclear, however, how
control accuracy and item selection times are related. One plausible
scenario is that individuals with a high degree of metacognitive
control need little time to make strategic decisions, in part, because
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many of these decisions are automated. This should lead to an inverse
relationship between selection time and accuracy; that is, as control
increases, selection times decrease. On the other hand, if item selection times include monitoring processes carried over from the previous item, we would expect a negative relationship between selection
time and control accuracy. This assumes that monitoring is a relatively nonautomated, time-consuming process.
Data collected from SAT studies can be used to test competing
hypotheses about the relationship between selection and response
times, and control accuracy. One possibility is that this relationship
changes systematically as a function of examinee knowledge, proficiency, practice, or test efficacy (Rocklin et al., 1995; Wise, 1994).
These changes could be studied easily by blocking examinees on any
of these variables or by manipulating controllable variables (e.g.,
instructions) directly.
Question three pertains to the specific relationship between expertise and control processes. Opinion appears to be split on this
matter. Some researchers have suggested that monitoring accuracy is
largely a by-product of domain-specific expertise (d. Glaser & Chi,
1988). However, a number of recent studies (Glenberg & Epstein,
1987; Morris, 1990; Schraw & Roedel, 1994) failed to show a relationship between monitoring accuracy and domain expertise. It is important to note, however, that the relationship between monitoring and
expertise may be quite different than the relationship between control
processes and expertise. Currently, we know of no study that examines control accuracy across different levels of expertise.
SAT provides a format for investigating the relative impact of
expertise on control processes, including performance accuracy, control accuracy, and item selection and response times. Although we
would expect expertise to be positively rela ted to test performance
and estimated proficiency, we would not necessarily predict a corresponding increase in control accuracy. This reflects our view that
control processes are, in part, domain-general phenomena (d. Schraw,
Dunkle, Bendixen, & Roedel, 1995). Although expertise should enable examinees to perform better on a test, their expertise need not
improve their ability to control or monitor with a high degree of
accuracy.
A fourth question is the degree to which control accuracy is
related to other cognitive variables such as general aptitude and
working memory span. Very little research has been done in this area
in general. Of studies that have investigated these relationships
directly or indirectly, there is little evidence that aptitude is related
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strongly to metacognitive processes in children (Alexander, Carr, &
Schwanenflugel, 1995; Swanson, 1990) or adults (Pressley & Ghatala,
1990; Yan, 1994). We know of no study investigating the relationship
among control and monitoring accuracy and traditional indices of the
speed and accuracy of working memory.
Research in this area is important for two reasons. One is to
establish the degree to which metacognitive processes such as control
and monitoring are related to "hard-wired" cognitive differences
such as general intelligence and working memory capacity (d. Jensen,
1992). Evidence that metacognition is not related strongly to these
variables would highlight the flexible, developmental nature of
metacognitive knowledge. A second reason is to examine the compensatory relationship between measures of cognitive ability and
metacognitive knowledge. In a ground-breaking study by Swanson
(1990), for example, metacognitive knowledge contributed to complex
problem solving among young adolescents over and above the effect
of ability. This finding suggests that metacognition may follow a
separate developmental path, and may act independent of other
cognitive mechanisms (see Alexander et al., 1995, for a further discussion).
Question five pertains to the still elusive relationship between
control and monitoring processes. Several theorists have distinguished clearly between control and monitoring processes (Koriat,
1994; Nelson & Narens, 1990; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990).
Nevertheless, much of the empirical literature in the field has
focused on monitoring rather than control processes, due in large part
to the difficulty researchers face when measuring control.
Some believe tha t control and monitoring are practically, if not
statistically, linked (Nelson & Narens, 1990, 1994). Others believe that
monitoring is both ftmctionally and statistically independent of control, and in fact, represents a fW1damentally different type of cognitive
activity (Koriat, 1993, 1994).
The literature is in need of further contributions on this point. We
believe self-adapted testing methods can be used with tremendous
advantage to address this question. Previously, w e described how
control processes may be quantified in a SAT via direct and indirect
measures obtained w10btrusively. It also is possible to obtain mea sures of monitoring via subjective judgments made after answering a
test question within the otherwise computer-based format of SAT.
Control and monitoring indices could be compared over the course of
a test to determine their relationship. If the two are linked, one would
expect monitoring judgments made at item selection to be linked to
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item selection at item i + 1. Data of this type, as well as a variety of
derived indices of control and monitoring, could be used to test the
efficacy of a regulatory loop that connects monitoring and control
functions. In this view, monitoring processes provide data-driven
feedback to control processes that use this feedback to iteratively
guide future performance. This presumes that monitoring and control processes are flexible, reciprocal processes that communicate with
each other, even if they do not share a common set of cognitive
resources.
It is possible that control and monitoring processes are related in
different ways as a function of expertise. For example, control and
monitoring may be related more strongly as expertise increases,
provided these processes become mutually encapsulated within the
expert domain (Glaser & Chi, 1988). If control and monitoring skills
remain domain-general in nature, then expertise within a domain
should not matter. Another possibility is that control and monitoring
are unrelated (Koriat, 1993, 1994). In this view, monitoring processes
are "parasitic" in that they are based on domain know ledge and
efficacy beliefs within the domain, rather than a metacognitive mechanism that actually monitors the accuracy of performance independent
of domain knowledge.
A final question addresses the degree to which individuals are
better able to control their subsequent performance than, for instance,
a minimum-error computer algorithm. Part of our interest in this
question stems from the finding that some individuals perform better
on a SAT than on a comparable CAT (Rocklin, 1994; Wise et al. 1992;
Wise, Roos, Plake, & Nebelsick-Gullett, 1994). Wise (1994, p. 18), for
example, stated "when examinees are allowed to choose their test
item difficulty levels, they perceive a sense of control over the test,
which serves to reduce anxiety" and which presumably improves
performance. Echoing Wise's (1994) thoughts on perceived control,
Rocklin et al. (1995, p. 114) stated that "the effects of self-adapted
testing can be attributed specifically to the control that examinees
exert over the difficulty levels of items they attempt." One explanation of the difference between SAT and CAT versions of the same test
is that many examinees experience less anxiety when taking a SAT
(Wise et al., 1994). Another explanation, although not mutually
exclusive from the reduced anxiety hypothesis, is that some individuals are better able to control their performance than even the most
accurate computer-driven selection algorithms. One way to test this
difference is to offer good and poor controllers the opportunity to take
similar exams using both SAT and CAT formats. Coupled with on-
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line or retrospective verbal reports, a comparison between the two
methods may illuminate some of the subtle control processes used
during testing.
_
These six questions present an impressive array of topics that
warrant further research. Understanding control processes with more
precision is important in and of itself. However, understanding the
crucial relationship between control and monitoring is even more
important, because it is inconceivable that researchers could claim to
understand metacognition without understanding the locus and functions of control and monitoring under a wide variety of circumstances, as well as the relationship between them. Similarly, it is
essential to understand what makes a highly metacognitive person so
able to self-regulate his or her behavior. Comparing good and poor
controllers (and monitors) to existing computer software may provide
some illustrative insights that increase our understanding, while
posing new research questions.
SUM MARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter explored some of the possibilities of using a computer-based testing format to investigate metacognitive processes.
We reviewed recent research on control (i.e., regulatory processes
used to guide cognitive activities) and monitoring (i.e., regulatory
processes used to evaluate the present success of one's performance)
functions of metacognition.
After highlighting some of the basic assumptions of computerbased testing, we described several specific strengths of self-adapted
testing (SAT). We argued that SAT alleviates a number of serious
methodological problems endemic to traditional tests. These included confounds due to differences in ability, prior knowledge, and
item difficulty. A more salient problem was that traditional tests do
not allow examinees to exert full control over their test-taking behavior. SAT eliminates this problem, and simultaneously offers researchers the opportunity to gather valuable information unobtrusively.
We next considered some of the direct (e.g., item selection time)
and indirect (e.g., control accuracy) measures available when using
SAT. These measures can be used to answer a host of questions about
metacognitive control, as well as the relationship between control and
monitoring processes. In addition, it is possible to compare good and
poor monitors, as well as to compare the same examinee under CAT
and SAT testing conditions. These comparisons offer a unique opportunity to study many aspects of metacognition in a much more direct,
yet unobtrusive manner.
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Our main conclusion was that computer-based testing formats
offer a number of new methodological avenues for the study of
metacognition. We proposed six questions that warrant considerable
research over the next decade. Chief among these is the relationship
between control and monitoring processes, whether these processes
share a common pool of resources, and whether they enjoy a reciprocal exchange of information indicative of a regulatory loop. Although
little was said concerning developmental issues, we see little difficulty
applying these procedures to younger examinees, provided individuals have some knowledge of the test domain, and researchers have
access to a calibrated pool of test items.
Finally, despite the tremendous potential of self-adapted testing
as a tool for measuring meta cognition, we wish to emphasize its
essential compatibility with other measurement techniques. SAT seems
amenable to on-line and retrospective verbal reports, as well as to online subjective performance judgments similar to those used in most
monitoring studies. SAT also provides an opportunity to investigate
the criteria examinees use to select test items. Concurrent verbal
reports may be highly valuable in this regard.
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